We analyze evidence production in merger control as a delegation problem in an inquisitorial competition policy system. The antitrust agency’s incentives to produce evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal depend critically on its action set. Allowing for a compromising remedy solution reduces information acquisition incentives, and could therefore reduce consumer welfare. The effort-frustrating effect of the remedy solution can be eliminated if a remedy solution can be implemented only after evidence on the efficiency of a merger proposal has been produced.

中文翻译：

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合并控制中的证据产生：补救措施的作用

我们在询价竞争政策体系中将并购控制中的证据生产作为委托问题进行了分析。反托拉斯机构提供有关合并提案效率证据的动机在很大程度上取决于其采取的行动。允许妥协的解决方案会减少信息获取的诱因，因此可能会减少消费者的福利。如果仅在产生合并建议效率的证据之后才可以实施补救解决方案，则可以消除补救解决方案的麻烦工作效果。