ABSTRACT

This paper argues that Frankfurt-style counterexamples do not compromise the agent’s ability to decide otherwise. In his attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, Frankfurt relied on what Austin called the ‘all-in’ sense of ‘can’, and misconstrued the agent’s inability to do otherwise as an all-in can’t. Like the new dispositionalists, I maintain that the agent’s relevant abilities are ‘masked’ rather than lost in Frankfurt cases. The argument from masked abilities, however, is not confined to a compatibilist construal of the relevant abilities. On a libertarian construal, Black deprives Jones of the opportunity to use his two-way power of choice to a different outcome than he actually uses it. I argue that being deprived of this opportunity is immaterial to what free will requires. In the second half of the paper, I relate my approach to the ‘flicker of freedom’ strategy. On closer look, we find a residual ability that Jones not only possesses but also exercises in cases where Black intervenes. I argue that Jones tries to decide otherwise in these cases, that Black only thwarts the success of Jones’s attempt, and that being snatched from the wheel at the very last moment does not compromise Jones’s free will.

摘要

本文认为，法兰克福式的反例不会损害代理人做出其他决定的能力。在对“替代可能性原则”的攻击中，法兰克福依靠奥斯丁所谓的“全能”“可以”的感觉，并且误解了代理人无能为力，因为全能不能做。像新的性情主义者一样，我坚持认为代理人的相关能力是“掩盖”的，而不是在法兰克福案件中丧失的。但是，掩盖能力的论点并不局限于相关能力的相容论者。在自由主义者的con变中，布莱克剥夺了琼斯利用自己的双向选择权获得与实际使用不同的结果的机会。我认为，被剥夺这一机会对自由意志的要求无关紧要。在本文的后半部分，我将自己的方法与“自由闪烁”策略联系起来。仔细观察，我们发现琼斯不仅具有剩余能力，而且在布莱克干预的情况下也具有锻炼能力。我认为琼斯在这些情况下，我们试图做出其他决定，即布莱克只能阻止琼斯尝试的成功，并且在最后一刻被从车轮上夺走并不损害琼斯的自由意志。