ABSTRACT

Regions are often viewed like businesses that compete with each other for people, investments and jobs. Private-sector instruments are being adopted in this context without providing evidence for positive management outcomes and clarifying the conditions under which their application is meaningful. Against this background, the German Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture (BMEL) tested three instruments as part of a pilot programme: the selection of regions eligible for financial assistance through a competitive process, management based on quantifiable targets and the comprehensive decentralization of decision-making, including the administration of those funds that BMEL allocated to the regions. Based on 124 interviews, 61 participant observations and documentary research, we contribute to the literature on rural governance and entrepreneurial regions in showing that these instruments are less effective, efficient and legitimate than New Public Management theory purports. We argue that these deficits do not result essentially from an inappropriate use of the instruments as often proposed but from general problems associated with actor constellations, institutions and the policy context. Therefore, we suggest not to use the instruments tested and recommend instruments focusing on regional needs, mutual learning and democratically legitimized institutions.

摘要

地区通常被视为在人员、投资和工作方面相互竞争的企业。在这种情况下，私营部门的工具被采用，但没有为积极的管理成果提供证据，也没有澄清其应用有意义的条件。在此背景下，德国联邦粮食和农业部 (BMEL) 作为试点计划的一部分测试了三种工具：通过竞争过程选择有资格获得财政援助的地区、基于可量化目标的管理以及决策权的全面下放。制定，包括管理 BMEL 分配给区域的资金。基于 124 次访谈、61 次参与观察和文献研究，我们对农村治理和创业区域的文献做出贡献，表明这些工具不如新公共管理理论所声称的那样有效、高效和合法。我们认为，这些缺陷本质上并不是由于经常提出的工具使用不当，而是由于与行为者群、机构和政策背景相关的普遍问题。因此，我们建议不要使用经过测试的工具，并推荐关注区域需求、相互学习和民主合法化机构的工具。我们认为，这些缺陷本质上并不是由于经常提出的工具使用不当，而是由于与行为者群、机构和政策背景相关的普遍问题。因此，我们建议不要使用经过测试的工具，并推荐关注区域需求、相互学习和民主合法化机构的工具。我们认为，这些缺陷本质上并不是由于经常提出的工具使用不当，而是由于与行为者群、机构和政策背景相关的普遍问题。因此，我们建议不要使用经过测试的工具，并推荐关注区域需求、相互学习和民主合法化机构的工具。