Our paper intersects two topics in growth theory: the growth maximizing government size and the role of Social Capital in development. We modify a simple overlapping generations framework by introducing two key features: a production function à la Barro together with the possibility that public officials steal a fraction of public resources under their own control. As underlined by the literature on corruption, Social Capital affects public officials' accountability through many channels which also affect the probability of being caught for embezzlement and misappropriation of public resources. Therefore, in our endogenous growth model such probability is taken as a proxy of Social Capital. We find that maximum growth rates are compatible with Big Government size, measured both in terms of expenditures and public officials, when associated with high levels of Social Capital.

中文翻译：

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增长最大化政府规模，社会资本和腐败

本文与增长理论中的两个主题相交：最大化政府规模的增长和社会资本在发展中的作用。我们通过引入两个关键特征来修改简单的重叠世代框架：生产功能àla Barro以及公共官员有可能在自己的控制下窃取一部分公共资源的可能性。正如有关腐败的文献所强调的那样，社会资本通过许多渠道影响公职人员的问责制，这也影响到被盗用和挪用公共资源的可能性。因此，在我们的内生增长模型中，这种可能性被视为社会资本的代名词。我们发现，就支出和政府官员而言，最大增长率与大政府规模是一致的，