In cloud computing, service composition provides an appealing paradigm to compose existing single services into a powerful workflow. The critical issues in service composition is that service providers may lie about the service's cost and QoS for more profits. However, existing studies only address the issue of services' untruthful cost, none of the studies consider both the issue of untruthful cost and untruthful QoS. Thus, it is necessary to design an incentive mechanism to motivate service providers to offer services with the truthful cost and truthful QoS. To address the above challenging issues, we propose the strategy‐proof auction mechanism for service composition (SPASC), which can determine the winners and dynamically calculate the price of services. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to design an incentive mechanism to motivate service providers to offer services with the truthful cost and truthful QoS in this field. Furthermore, we propose an auction algorithm to implement the SPASC. Both theoretical proof and the extensively experimental results validate that SPASC achieves the truthfulness and individual rationality. At the same time, the experimental results also prove that this mechanism can motivate service providers to offer services with the truthful cost and truthful QoS.

中文翻译：

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SPASC：具有成本和QoS激励的战略组合拍卖机制，用于服务组合

在云计算中，服务组合提供了一种吸引人的范例，可以将现有的单个服务组合成功能强大的工作流程。服务组合中的关键问题是服务提供商可能会依靠服务的成本和QoS来获取更多利润。但是，现有研究仅解决服务的不真实成本问题，没有研究同时考虑不真实的成本和不真实的QoS问题。因此，有必要设计一种激励机制，以激励服务提供商提供具有真实成本和真实QoS的服务。为了解决上述挑战性问题，我们提出了一种针对服务组合的战略验证拍卖机制（SPASC），该机制可以确定获胜者并动态计算服务价格。据我们所知，这是设计激励机制以激励服务提供商在该领域以真实成本和真实QoS提供服务的第一项研究。此外，我们提出了一种拍卖算法来实现SPASC。理论证明和广泛的实验结果均证明SPASC实现了真实性和个人理性。同时，实验结果也证明该机制可以激励服务提供商以真实的成本和真实的QoS提供服务。