Firms using e-commerce as platforms need to develop effective mechanisms to govern seller opportunism. This paper attempts to explore the effect of seller community engagement, as an informal mechanism of network governance, on seller opportunistic behaviors. In particular, we identify two types of the seller community established by the e-commerce platforms, which offers infrastructures supporting tightly and loosely coupled relationships among members, respectively. We find that engaging in both types of communities reduces seller opportunistic behaviors. We also show that the intensity of competition positively moderates the relationship between engagement in the communities with tight infrastructure and sellers’ opportunistic behaviors, while deterrence perception exerts a negative moderating effect on the relationship. In contrast, the intensity of competition negatively moderates the relationship between engagement in communities with loose infrastructure and opportunistic behaviors. The findings provide theoretical and managerial implications for opportunism governance in electronic markets.

使用电子商务作为平台的公司需要开发有效的机制来管理卖方的机会主义。本文试图探索作为网络治理的非正式机制的卖方社区参与对卖方机会主义行为的影响。特别是，我们确定了由电子商务平台建立的两种类型的卖方社区，它们提供了分别支持成员之间紧密和松散耦合的关系的基础结构。我们发现，参与这两种类型的社区都会减少卖方的机会主义行为。我们还表明，竞争的激烈程度积极地缓和了基础设施紧张的社区中的参与与卖方的投机行为之间的关系，而威慑感知则对这种关系产生了负面的调节作用。相比之下，竞争的激烈程度不利于缓和基础设施松散的社区中的参与与机会主义行为之间的关系。这些发现为电子市场中的机会主义治理提供了理论和管理意义。