ABSTRACT

This paper presents a chronological survey of the 20 academic papers that Malcolm authored or co-authored between 1997 and 2017 on the flawed design – and hence flawed implementation – of the European Monetary Union (EMU)’s macroeconomic policy pillars. We augment his analyses by pointing out a third – complementary – design flaw: the EMU’s two-tiered structure of financial regulation and oversight. While this financial pillar aimed at reconciling Europe’s historically bank-based financial systems with large European banks’ entry into global financial competition, it created a combustible mix when combined with the EMU’s macroeconomic-policy pillars. The Global Financial Crisis lit the fire: member-nations, forced to rescue their domestically-chartered too-big-to-fail megabanks, had to adopt austerity policies that both slowed the pace of post-crisis economic growth and eroded support for pro-Union political leaders. Only marginal changes have been made in these policy pillars post-crisis. Consequently, Europe faces a financial bifurcation point: either to continue ‘whatever it takes’ support for its megabanks, or to rethink both its financial architecture and its macroeconomic and financial policy pillars.

摘要

本文对马尔科姆在 1997 年至 2017 年期间撰写或合着的 20 篇学术论文进行了按时间顺序排列的调查，这些论文涉及欧洲货币联盟 (EMU) 宏观经济政策支柱的有缺陷的设计——因此也有缺陷的实施。我们通过指出第三个——补充——设计缺陷来加强他的分析：欧洲货币联盟的金融监管和监督的两级结构。虽然这一金融支柱旨在协调欧洲历史上以银行为基础的金融体系与欧洲大型银行进入全球金融竞争，但当与欧洲货币联盟的宏观经济政策支柱相结合时，它创造了一个可燃的组合。全球金融危机点燃了火焰：成员国被迫拯救其国内特许的大到不能倒的大型银行，不得不采取紧缩政策，既减缓了危机后经济增长的步伐，又削弱了对亲工会政治领导人的支持。危机后这些政策支柱只发生了微小的变化。因此，欧洲面临着一个金融分歧点：要么继续“不惜一切代价”支持其大型银行，要么重新思考其金融架构及其宏观经济和金融政策支柱。