Research and Development activities are very credit constrained in several poor nations with weak institutions. To curb the financial barrier, governments apply development banking policies. A common one is the subsidization of private banks in order for them to increase the loans for Research and Development. This article analyzes the implication of this policy for economic growth, when it is financed with taxes on old successful entrepreneurs and, at the beginning, the financial market for research loans was completely depressed due to a moral hazard problem and the low quality of the institutions. I found that regardless of the magnitude of the tax rate, a minimum level of quality of the institutions is required for the achievement of any success. Interestingly, if there is a range of tax boosting productivity, it may be very tight and this points at the relevance of the proper design of the development banking policies. Finally, even if this policy can boost the technological level of a poor economy, it is not possible to achieve convergence with leading economies and any positive implication for the welfare of the entrepreneurs is not granted.

在一些机构薄弱的贫穷国家，研发活动受到很大的信用约束。为了遏制金融壁垒，政府实施了开发银行政策。常见的一种是对私人银行进行补贴，以使它们增加用于研究和开发的贷款。本文分析了这一政策对经济增长的影响，这种政策是对成功的老企业家征税，而在一开始时，由于道德风险问题和机构质量低下，研究贷款的金融市场就完全萧条了。 。我发现，不管税率的高低，要取得成功，都必须达到最低的机构质量水平。有趣的是，如果有一系列提高生产力的税收措施，它可能非常紧，这说明了开发银行政策的正确设计的相关性。最后，即使这项政策可以提高贫困经济体的技术水平，也无法与领先经济体实现融合，并且对企业家的福利也没有任何积极影响。