Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) model a setting where investors disagree and short-sales constraints cause pessimistic views of stock prices to be less influential, which leads to speculative stock prices. A theoretical implication of the model is that existing shareholders can exploit the speculative stock prices by (i) designing managerial compensation contracts that encourage short-term performance, and (ii) subsequently selling their shares to more optimistic investors. We document empirical support for this theory by finding that an exogenous removal (Regulation SHO) of short-sales constraints curbs the provision of short-term incentives, an effect reflected in longer CEO compensation duration. The effect is concentrated among stocks with high investor disagreement and short-term-oriented institutional ownership. Consistent with prior work, we also find that longer CEO compensation duration leads to longer CEO investment horizons, less overinvestment, and less earnings management. Collectively, our results speak to the contributing role of speculative stock prices in corporate short-termism. Finally, our study implies that effective policies to curb corporate short-termism should address stock market speculation and promote mechanisms that tie executive compensation to longer-term stock price performance.

中文翻译：

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投机市场中的短期 CEO 薪酬：受控实验*

Bolton、Scheinkman 和 Xiong (2006) 模拟了一个投资者不同意和卖空限制导致对股价的悲观看法影响较小的环境，从而导致投机性股价。该模型的一个理论含义是，现有股东可以通过 (i) 设计鼓励短期业绩的管理薪酬合同，以及 (ii) 随后将其股票出售给更乐观的投资者来利用投机性股票价格。我们通过发现卖空约束的外生消除（监管 SHO）抑制了短期激励措施的提供，从而证明了对该理论的实证支持，这种影响反映在更长的 CEO 薪酬期限上。影响主要集中在投资者意见分歧较大且机构所有权为短期的股票中。与之前的研究一致，我们还发现 CEO 薪酬期限越长，CEO 投资期限越长，过度投资越少，盈余管理越少。总的来说，我们的结果说明了投机性股票价格在企业短期主义中的作用。最后，我们的研究表明，抑制企业短期主义的有效政策应该解决股市投机问题，并促进将高管薪酬与长期股价表现联系起来的机制。