Kripke's thesis that meaning is normative is typically interpreted, following Boghossian, as the thesis that meaningful expressions allow of true or warranted use. I argue for an alternative interpretation centered on Wittgenstein's conception of the normativity involved in “knowing how to go on” in one's use of an expression. Meaning is normative for Kripke because it justifies claims, not to be saying something true, but to be going on as one ought from previous uses of the expression. I argue that this represents a distortion of Wittgenstein's conception of the normativity of meaning, and that Wittgenstein's conception is preferable.

中文翻译：

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做一个应该做的事：克里普克和维特根斯坦论意义的规范性

克里普克关于意义是规范性的论点通常被解释为遵循博格斯主义，即有意义的表达允许真实或合理使用的论点。我主张另一种解释，该解释以维特根斯坦的规范性概念为中心，该规范性涉及在一个人使用表达时“知道如何继续”。意义对克里普克来说是规范的，因为它证明了主张，不是说一些真实的事情，而是按照以前使用该表达的方式进行。我认为这代表了对维特根斯坦意义规范性概念的扭曲，而维特根斯坦的概念更可取。