In this paper I lay out, argue for, and defend ethical Mooreanism. In essence, the view says that some moral propositions are Moorean propositions and thus are epistemically superior to the conjunctions of the premises of skeptical arguments to the contrary. In Sect. 1 I explain Mooreanism and then ethical Mooreanism. In Sect. 2 I argue for ethical Mooreanism by noting a number of important epistemic parities that hold between certain moral truths and standard Moorean facts. In Sect. 3 I defend ethical Mooreanism against the objection that moral propositions are too epistemically dissimilar to standard Moorean facts to count as Moorean truths.

在本文中，我提出，主张并捍卫道德摩尔人主义。从本质上讲，这种观点认为，某些道德命题是摩尔命题，因此在认识论上优于持相反观点的怀疑论前提的结合。昆虫。1我先解释摩尔人主义，然后再解释道德摩尔人主义。昆虫。2我通过指出在某些道德真理与标准摩尔人事实之间存在的许多重要的认识对等来主张道德的摩尔人主义。昆虫。3我捍卫道德的摩尔人主义，反对以下观点：道德主张在认识论上与标准的摩尔人事实太不同，以至于不能算作摩尔人的真理。