According to Ole Hjortland, Timothy Williamson, Graham Priest, and others, anti-exceptionalism about logic is the view that logic “isn’t special”, but is continuous with the sciences. Logic is revisable, and its truths are neither analytic nor a priori. And logical theories are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories are. What isn’t special, we argue, is anti-exceptionalism about logic. Anti-exceptionalists disagree with one another regarding what logic and, indeed, anti-exceptionalism are, and they are at odds with naturalist philosophers of logic, who may have seemed like natural allies. Moreover, those internal battles concern well-trodden philosophical issues, and there is no hint as to how they are to be resolved on broadly scientific grounds. We close by looking at three of the founders of logic who may have seemed like obvious enemies of anti-exceptionalism—Aristotle, Frege, and Carnap—and conclude that none of their positions is clearly at odds with at least some of the main themes of anti-exceptionalism. We submit that, at least at present, anti-exceptionalism is too vague or underspecified to characterize a coherent conception of logic, one that stands opposed to more traditional approaches.

Ole Hjortland，Timothy Williamson，Graham Priest和其他人认为，关于逻辑的反例外主义认为逻辑“不是特别的”，但与科学是连续的。逻辑是可修改的，其真理既不是分析性的也不是先验性的。逻辑理论是在与科学理论相同的基础上进行修订的。我们认为，关于逻辑的反例外主义并不特别。反例外论者在逻辑学和反例外论论上是彼此不同意的，并且与逻辑主义的自然主义者相似，后者似乎是自然的盟友。此外，这些内部斗争涉及人们深思熟虑的哲学问题，也没有暗示应如何在广泛的科学基础上解决这些问题。最后，我们看一下似乎是反例外主义的明显敌人的三位逻辑创始人–亚里斯多德，弗雷格和卡尔纳普–并得出结论，他们的立场显然与至少一些主要主题并不一致。反例外主义。我们认为，至少在目前，反例外主义过于模糊或不足以至于无法描述一种统一的逻辑概念，这一概念与更传统的方法相反。