I study how framing payoffs as losses affects group coordination using the minimum effort game. The previous literature shows groups as small as four have a difficult time coordinating on an efficient outcome, even in the presence of higher payoffs for more efficient outcomes. Though penalties for inefficient coordination behavior have been studied in a variety of contexts, the role of losses on coordination behavior has not. Loss framing has been shown to induce more efficient actions in a variety of other areas, since individuals tend to be more sensitive to losses than gains. I examine the framing effect of losses, specifically if framing payoffs as losses can lead to payoff-dominant coordination, using three treatments. These treatments help tease out the effects and dynamics of coordination behavior when payoffs are framed as losses. I find that framing payoffs as losses leads to improvements in coordination, demonstrating the robustness of loss framing in the setting of the minimum effort game.

我研究了使用最小努力博弈将成帧的收益作为损失如何影响小组的协调。先前的文献显示，即使存在较高的回报以实现更有效的结果，只有四个人的小组也很难协调有效的结果。尽管已经在各种情况下研究了对无效协调行为的惩罚，但损失对协调行为的作用尚未得到研究。由于个人倾向于对损失比对收益更敏感，因此，损失定框架已被证明可以在许多其他领域引发更有效的行动。我研究了损失的成帧效应，特别是使用三种方法将成帧的收益作为损失可以导致收益主导的协调性时，尤其如此。当收益被视为损失时，这些处理方法有助于弄清协调行为的影响和动态。