All law is relatively coarse after its initial implementation as the legislature cannot foresee all contingencies that can arise in the actual application of the law. Therefore, decisions need to be made by street-level administrators as novel and particular circumstances arise. Economists have largely ignored the political science literature on street-level bureaucrats, such as policemen, welfare case managers, or regulatory agents. I present a case study in the context of market entry regulation in Germany. Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that bureaucratic discretion exists, that is, administrative actions can be found on different ends of a decision space, and that its effects are potentially large. Administrators do not apply legislation in a uniform manner and we observe a systematically different application of rules across subnational jurisdictions.

中文翻译：

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官僚自由裁量权案例研究：德国市场准入监管的异质应用

所有法律在初步实施后都比较粗糙，因为立法机关无法预见到法律实际适用中可能出现的所有意外情况。因此，当出现新的特殊情况时，需要由街道管理人员做出决定。经济学家在很大程度上忽略了有关街头官僚的政治学文献，例如警察、福利案件经理或监管机构。我在德国市场准入监管的背景下提出了一个案例研究。定性和定量证据表明存在官僚自由裁量权，即行政行为可以在决策空间的不同端找到，并且其影响可能很大。