ABSTRACT

This paper offers a reading of passages in Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures in which Heidegger describes love as a feeling which grants an essential vision. I contend that by invoking this language of vision while simultaneously contrasting love with infatuation, Heidegger is implicitly attempting to situate love within his category of fundamental attunements. While Heidegger does not explicitly follow this thought through, I argue that doing so leads to a problem—namely, how can love be a fundamental attunement if such attunements are necessarily objectless? I suggest we can see a response to this problem in Heidegger’s treatment of Plato’s Phaedrus within the same lecture course. I conclude by claiming that while Heidegger attempts to follow Plato in arguing that love is most properly directed towards Being, love nonetheless poses a challenge to Heidegger’s category of fundamental attunements which also strikes at the heart of his claim that ontology is first philosophy.

摘要

本文提供了对海德格尔尼采演讲中的段落的阅读，其中海德格尔将爱描述为一种赋予基本愿景的感觉。我认为，通过调用这种视觉语言，同时将爱与迷恋进行对比，海德格尔隐含地试图将爱置于他的基本协调范畴内。虽然海德格尔没有明确地遵循这一思想，但我认为这样做会导致一个问题——即，如果这种调谐必然是无对象的，那么爱怎么能成为一种基本的调谐？我建议我们可以在海德格尔对柏拉图的《斐德鲁斯》的处理中看到对这个问题的回应在同一个讲座课程中。我最后声称，虽然海德格尔试图追随柏拉图，认为爱最恰当地指向存在，但爱仍然对海德格尔的基本协调范畴提出了挑战，这也触及了他关于本体论是第一哲学的主张的核心。