ABSTRACT

This study aims to explore the influence of supplier-buyer cooperation (contract governance and relationship governance) on supply chain financing availability from the bilateral perspective of small and medium-sized enterprises and their suppliers (or buyers) based on the transaction cost theory. A total of 248 valid paired questionnaires were received from small and medium enterprises and their suppliers (or buyers). Multiple regression analysis was used to test the hypotheses. The results show that: (1) contract governance is more effective than relationship governance on supply chain financing availability, and the two forms of governance have a positive interaction effect. (2) Opportunism plays a mediating role between supplier-buyer cooperation and supply chain financing availability. Contract governance improves supply chain financing availability more strongly than relationship governance, by reducing supply chain financing risks. (3) Financing alignment has a positive moderating effect on the relationship between opportunism and supply chain financing availability.

摘要

本研究旨在基于交易成本理论，从中小企业及其供应商（或买方）的双边视角探讨供需双方合作（合同治理和关系治理）对供应链融资可用性的影响。共收到来自中小企业及其供应商（或采购商）的有效配对问卷248份。多元回归分析用于检验假设。结果表明：（1）合同治理比关系治理对供应链融资可用性更有效，两种治理形式具有正向交互作用。(2)机会主义在供需合作与供应链融资可用性之间起中介作用。通过降低供应链融资风险，合同治理比关系治理更有效地提高了供应链融资的可用性。(3) 融资一致性对机会主义和供应链融资可用性之间的关系具有正向调节作用。