There is robust evidence in the experimental economics literature showing that monopoly power is affected by trading institutions. In this paper, we study whether trading institutions themselves can shape agents' market behavior through the formation of anchors. We recreate experimentally five different double-auction market structures (perfect competition, perfect competition with quotas, cartel on price, cartel on price with quotas, and monopoly) in a within-subject design, varying the order of markets implementation. We investigate whether monopoly power endures the formation of price anchors emerged in previously implemented market structures. Results from our classroom experiments suggest that double-auction trading institutions succeed in preventing monopolists from exploiting their market power. Furthermore, the formation of price anchors in previously implemented markets negatively impacts on monopolists' power in later market structures.

中文翻译：

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在双重拍卖市场实验中控制垄断力量

实验经济学文献中有强有力的证据表明，垄断权力受贸易机构的影响。在本文中，我们研究了交易机构本身是否可以通过锚的形成来塑造代理人的市场行为。我们在主体内设计中实验性地重新创建了五种不同的双重拍卖市场结构（完全竞争、完全竞争配额、价格卡特尔、配额价格卡特尔和垄断），改变市场实施的顺序。我们调查垄断力量是否能忍受先前实施的市场结构中出现的价格锚的形成。我们课堂实验的结果表明，双重拍卖交易机构成功地阻止了垄断者利用他们的市场力量。此外，