Courts may reason using precedents in various ways, but not all of them satisfy the rule of law. This article provides two ways that are compatible with this ideal and one which is not. In doing so, the article aims to explain the practice of following precedent in law and to offer criteria for evaluating its value. Two claims are defended. First, courts always have a reason to decide precedent-governed disputes by following precedent. This reason is a minimum requirement of the rule of law, and in some cases this reason may be reinforced in the form of an obligation. Secondly, depending on whether courts have a reason or an obligation to follow precedent, two modes of precedential reasoning may be identified. The article explains them in detail. The modes, together with the considerations that are reasons in favour of them or against them, provide a valuable philosophical foundation of precedent-following in law.

中文翻译：

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先例与法治

法院可能会以各种方式使用先例进行推理，但并非所有先例都满足法治。本文提供了两种与此理想兼容的方法和一种不兼容的方法。在此过程中，本文旨在解释遵循法律先例的做法，并提供评估其价值的标准。两项索赔得到辩护。首先，法院总是有理由通过遵循先例来决定先例管辖的争议。这个理由是法治的最低要求，在某些情况下，这个理由可能会以义务的形式得到加强。其次，根据法院是否有理由或有义务遵循先例，可以确定两种先例推理模式。文章详细解释了它们。模式，连同支持或反对它们的理由的考虑因素，