Policymakers in emerging markets complained that the unconventional US monetary policy response to the Great Recession hurt their economies. US policymakers responded that the policy was geared toward conditions in the US, and that a strong US economy benefited everyone. Here we evaluate these claims in a two country model of the US and an emerging market country, bombarded by shocks to the net worth of US banks. Our model allows us to calculate a “passive equilibrium” in which US monetary policy does not respond to the shock in any way. Then, we calculate a “self oriented” equilibrium in which quantitative easing is set optimally to maximize US welfare, and a “cooperative” equilibrium in which quantitative easing and the monetary policy in the emerging market country are set to maximize joint welfare. Comparing welfare in these equilibria, we find that the self oriented US monetary policy benefits both countries, and that cooperation brings little further improvements in welfare.

新兴市场的决策者抱怨说，美国对大萧条采取的非常规货币政策反应损害了其经济。美国决策者回应说，该政策是针对美国国情的，而强劲的美国经济使所有人受益。在这里，我们在美国和新兴市场国家这两个国家的模型中评估了这些债权，这些模型都受到了美国银行净资产的冲击。我们的模型使我们能够计算出“被动均衡”，在这种均衡中，美国货币政策不会以任何方式应对冲击。然后，我们计算出一种“自我导向”的均衡，在该均衡中，最优的量化宽松政策被设定为最大化美国福利；而一个“合作性”的均衡中，其量化宽松政策和新兴市场国家的货币政策被设置为最大化联合福利。比较这些均衡中的福利，