We propose a game-theoretic framework to study the outcomes of packetized payments - a cross-ledger transaction protocol - with strategic and possibly malicious agents. We derive the transaction failure rate and demonstrate that packetized payments are likely to be incomplete, at least without disciplinary mechanisms. Our analysis suggests that collateral deposits can prevent malicious agents to take advantage of the protocols, and we infer that the deposit amount should depend on the underlying asset price volatility or that it should be dynamically adjusted as the prices changes.

中文翻译：

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带分组支付的交叉账本掉期的博弈论分析

我们提出了一个博弈论框架，用于研究具有战略性和可能是恶意代理的分组支付的结果（一种交叉账本交易协议）。我们得出交易失败率，并证明至少在没有纪律机制的情况下，分包付款可能是不完整的。我们的分析表明，抵押存款可以阻止恶意代理利用协议，并且我们推断，存款金额应取决于基础资产价格的波动性，或者应随价格变化而动态调整。