This article discusses Brazil's prudential developmentalism through a case study that challenges the expected trade-off between Basel rules and the developmental state. Under the Brazilian arrangement, the Central Bank has substantially implemented the new Basel rules, while policymakers have dealt with significant developmental mechanism. This piece's central claim is that two institutional capacities support prudential developmentalism. The first is the Brazilian Central Bank's regulatory capacity to enforce Basel, which derives from the maximization of its institutional conditions and the minimization of the banks' regulatory costs. The second is the developmental state's capacity to foster economically relevant domestic business, observing prudential standards. Despite providing stability and room for local policy, the arrangement has downsides, mainly the restricted credit market and less transformative finance.

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审慎发展主义：解释巴西银行业监管中发展型国家与巴塞尔规则的结合

本文通过一个案例研究讨论了巴西的审慎发展主义，该案例研究挑战了巴塞尔规则与发展国家之间的预期权衡。在巴西的安排下，央行实质上落实了巴塞尔新规则，政策制定者则处理了重要的发展机制问题。本文的核心主张是两种制度能力支持审慎发展主义。首先是巴西央行执行巴塞尔协议的监管能力，这种能力源于其制度条件的最大化和银行监管成本的最小化。第二是发展型国家在遵守审慎标准的情况下培育与经济相关的国内业务的能力。尽管为地方政策提供了稳定性和空间，但这种安排也有缺点，主要是信贷市场受到限制，金融变革性较小。