A significant proportion of states grants constitutional recognition to a single religion, leaving various other religions within society constitutionally unrecognised. Many philosophers believe that this is problematic even when such recognition is (almost) wholly symbolic. The four most common and prima facie plausible objections to what I call ‘mono-recognition’ are that it alienates citizens who do not adhere to the constitutionally recognised religion; that it symbolically subordinates these individuals; that it reinforces oppressive social hierarchies; and that it violates principles of justificatory neutrality. This article shows that none of these objections establish that mono-recognition is wrong within contemporary societies—or even merely pro tanto wrong. However, it goes on to propose a novel argument that does suggest that this type of religious establishment is pro tanto wrong within most societies, if not all. According to this argument, which I refer to as the ‘desire-based objection’, mono-recognition is pro tanto wrong when it fails to accommodate at least some citizens (a) who desire constitutional recognition of their unrecognised religion on morally reasonable, or simply not unreasonable, grounds or who would do so if they were to independently ponder the possibility of receiving such recognition without having to fear any social backlash that receiving it might cause and (b) whose religion is entitled to constitutional recognition based on the size of its population within society; the societal contributions of its members; and any injustices that its members have suffered at the hands of the state or the wider society. As I show, even when one particular religion has the strongest claim to constitutional recognition, this does not normally justify granting sole recognition to it given that the weaker claims of other religions could be accommodated under a system whereby state religions are rotated and recognised for different durations depending on the strength of their claims.

相当大比例的州将宪法承认为单一宗教，而社会上的其他宗教在宪法上却未被承认。许多哲学家认为，即使这种认识（几乎）完全是象征性的，这也是有问题的。我所谓的“单人承认”有四个最普遍和表面上看来合理的反对意见，那就是它疏远了不遵守宪法承认的宗教的公民。它象征性地服从这些人；加强了压迫性的社会等级制度；并且它违反了理由中立的原则。本文表明，所有这些反对意见都没有证明在现代社会中单认知是错误的，甚至只是亲密的错误的。但是，接着提出，确实表明，这种类型的宗教组织是一种新型的说法亲TANTO大多数社会中出错，如果不是全部。根据这个被我称为“基于欲望的异议”的论点，单认知是自然的如果它无法容纳至少一些公民，则是错误的（a）出于道德合理或根本不合理的理由而希望宪法认可其未承认的宗教，或如果他们独立地考虑是否可以接受这种承认而又不考虑的情况下会这样做的人，则是错误的担心可能会受到社会的强烈反对，并且（b）根据其社会人口的数量，其宗教有权获得宪法承认；其成员的社会贡献；以及其成员遭受国家或整个社会的不公正待遇。正如我所展示的，即使当一种特定的宗教最强烈地要求宪法承认时，