I consider two models of sponsored research — one is the model where researchers get funded until (if ever) a research project experiences the first failure (bad news model), the other one is the model where the winner (if any) of a research race is rewarded (good news model). In either case, the researchers start working on a project of unknown quality. The quality of the project is identified with its ability to generate failures or successes, in the first and second models, respectively. The rate of arrival of success conditioned on the quality of the project is an increasing function of the total time spent on research. I find equilibria in both models and show that in case of two competing researchers, one of the researchers experiments inefficiently long, in the bad news model or in the good news model when either the winner takes all, or the laggard is punished. In the good news model where the laggard is rewarded, the equilibrium outcome is efficient.

我考虑了两种赞助研究模型——一种是研究人员获得资助直到（如果有的话）研究项目第一次失败的模型（坏消息模型），另一种是研究获胜者（如果有的话）的模型种族得到奖励（好消息模型）。在任何一种情况下，研究人员都开始从事一个质量未知的项目。项目的质量分别以其在第一个和第二个模型中产生失败或成功的能力来确定。以项目质量为条件的成功率是研究总时间的递增函数。我在两个模型中都找到了平衡，并表明在两个相互竞争的研究人员的情况下，其中一个研究人员在坏消息模型或好消息模型中的实验时间效率低下，当赢家通吃时，或落后者受到惩罚。在奖励落后者的好消息模型中，均衡结果是有效的。