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Process Variation-Resistant Golden-Free Hardware Trojan Detection through a Power Side Channel
Security and Communication Networks Pub Date : 2021-03-03 , DOI: 10.1155/2021/8839222
Yidong Yuan 1, 2 , Yao Zhang 3, 4 , Yiqiang Zhao 1 , Xige Zhang 1, 2 , Ming Tang 3, 4
Affiliation  

With the globalization of the manufacturing supply chain, the malicious modification existing in the middle of distrust is becoming an important security issue on the chip. These modifications are called hardware Trojan (HT). HT is difficult to detect due to its high concealment and diversity of implementation. HT detection based on the side channel is a relatively effective detection method because it does not need to trigger the Trojan or destroy the chip. However, detection based on the side channel faces two major challenges. Firstly, the side channel detection is quite dependent on the golden model. The second one relates to the accuracy of the samples. Side channel information of the chip comes from the hardware manufacturing process and implementation, so it is obviously affected by process variation. In the existing work, many self-reference detection methods have been proposed to solve the problem of missing golden models. However, the existing methods often have special requirements for the circuit structure (such as the need for self-similar structures in the circuit). And, they can hardly resist process variation. This paper combines design and detection. We select the power consumption generated at different times and construct two self-reference ‘knapsack’ to detect HT. The solution proposed in this article is a kind of self-reference method, but we need neither self-similar structures nor the same state of some clocks in the circuit. Meanwhile, by constructing the ‘knapsack,’ we reduce the impact of process variation on detection accuracy because the process variation in the two sets of power consumption is balanced.

中文翻译:

通过电源侧通道检测抗过程变化的无金硬件特洛伊木马程序

随着制造业供应链的全球化,不信任中间存在的恶意修改正成为芯片上的重要安全问题。这些修改称为硬件特洛伊木马(HT)。由于HT的高度隐蔽性和实现的多样性,因此很难检测到。基于旁通道的HT检测是一种相对有效的检测方法,因为它无需触发木马或破坏芯片。然而,基于旁通道的检测面临两个主要挑战。首先,副信道检测完全依赖于黄金模型。第二个涉及样本的准确性。芯片的侧通道信息来自硬件制造过程和实现,因此显然受到过程变化的影响。在现有工作中 已经提出了许多自参考检测方法来解决缺少黄金模型的问题。但是,现有方法通常对电路结构有特殊要求(例如,电路中需要自相似结构)。而且,它们几乎无法抵抗工艺变化。本文将设计与检测结合在一起。我们选择在不同时间产生的功耗,并构造两个自参考“背包”来检测HT。本文提出的解决方案是一种自参考方法,但是我们既不需要自相似的结构,也不需要电路中某些时钟的相同状态。同时,通过构造“背包”,由于两组功耗中的过程变化是平衡的,因此我们减少了过程变化对检测精度的影响。
更新日期:2021-03-03
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