ABSTRACT

Using experiments in which participants play the role of polluting firms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits under two types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We find that the market price of pollution permits and the probability of violating permits holdings are higher with a fine that is convex in the level of violation than with one that is linear. This effect operates through an increase in the prices asked by sellers, not in the bids made by the buyers of permits. We do not observe an effect of the type of the fine on the average level of violation or the number of firms in violation in the case of emission standards. We conclude that the type of fines may affect the cost-effectiveness of pollution control programs based on tradable pollution permits.

摘要

通过参与者扮演污染企业角色的实验，我们研究了在两种罚款和两种不同监管工具下遵守排放限制的行为。我们发现污染许可证的市场价格和违反许可证持有的概率在违反水平凸的罚款比线性罚款更高。这种效应是通过卖方要求的价格上涨来实现的，而不是通过许可证买方的出价来实现的。在排放标准的情况下，我们没有观察到罚款类型对平均违规水平或违规企业数量的影响。我们得出结论，罚款类型可能会影响基于可交易污染许可证的污染控制计划的成本效益。