This paper studies reappointment of a chief executive officer (CEO) and succession events in listed family firms with an incumbent family CEO. We explore whether family firms with a founder CEO are more likely to engage in earnings management preevent than other family firms. We find evidence of preevent upward earnings management for firms that reappoint their founder CEO but no for other family firms. These findings suggest that the costs and benefits from earnings management change around founder CEO reappointments in family firms. Investors, auditors, policymakers and regulators should be aware of the temptation of founder CEOs to inflate earnings preceding their reappointment.

中文翻译：

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围绕创始人 CEO 重新任命和家族企业继任的盈余管理

本文研究了上市家族企业中首席执行官 (CEO) 的重新任命和继任事件，家族首席执行官在位。我们探讨了拥有创始人 CEO 的家族企业是否比其他家族企业更有可能进行盈余管理预防。我们发现对于重新任命创始人 CEO 的公司进行预防性向上盈余管理的证据，但对于其他家族企业则没有。这些发现表明，盈余管理的成本和收益会随着创始人 CEO 在家族企业的重新任命而发生变化。投资者、审计师、政策制定者和监管机构应该意识到创始人 CEO 在连任前夸大收益的诱惑。