Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the auction to guard against firms bidding low to win the contract and then cutting back on effort. While competition helps reduce the rent of efficient firms, it exacerbates the problem due to moral hazard. If allocative efficiency is a requirement, limiting the number of participants may be optimal. Alternatively, the same incentives can be optimally provided using inefficient allocation rules.

中文翻译：

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事后有道德风险的竞争性采购

与标准拍卖不同，我们表明竞争性采购可能会最佳地限制竞争或使用效率低下的分配规则，这些规则会将项目奖励给效率较低的公司，且概率为正。竞争过程结束后，采购项目通常会涉及事后道德风险。采购机制必须将激励方案与拍卖相结合，以防止企业竞标低价以赢得合同，然后减少工作量。竞争虽然有助于降低有效率的公司的租金，但由于道德风险，加剧了这一问题。如果需要分配效率，则限制参与者的数量可能是最佳的。可替代地，可以使用低效率的分配规则来最佳地提供相同的激励。