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The dynamics of institution building: State aids, the European commission, and the court of justice of the European Union
Journal of Comparative Economics ( IF 2.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-03 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2021.02.001
Amanda M. Alves , Eric Brousseau , Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung

This paper studies the interactions between European Union institutions and the Member States with regard to state aid control. The mandate of the European Commission includes the maintenance and strengthening of economic integration, and as such it may discipline any Member States that undermine the single market. Relying on an original database covering all state aid applications with rulings between 2000 and 2017, we show that, on the one hand, the Commission tends to reject programs originating from countries that are resistant to EU integration, which is proxied by the transposition deficit. On the other hand, when firms or national governments appeal the decisions made by the Commission, the reversal of the Commission's rejection decisions by the Court of Justice of the European Union is positively correlated with the transposition deficit. This evidence suggests that while the Commission is biased against countries with greater resistance to integration, the Court corrects this bias since its mandate is to guarantee the rule of law in the EU system of governance. We argue that these revealed policy preferences are consistent with the assumption that these two bodies attempt to strengthen their legitimacy by making decisions in line with their mandates. Moreover, the interaction between these twin pursuits of legitimacy reinforces the overall legitimacy of the Union, suggesting another driver of evolution in an equilibrium approach of institutions.



中文翻译:

制度建设的动力:国家援助、欧盟委员会和欧盟法院

本文研究了欧盟机构与成员国在国家援助控制方面的互动。欧盟委员会的职责包括维持和加强经济一体化,因此它可以对破坏单一市场的任何成员国进行纪律处分。依赖于涵盖 2000 年至 2017 年间裁决的所有国家援助申请的原始数据库,我们表明,一方面,委员会倾向于拒绝源自对欧盟一体化有抵抗力的国家的计划,而欧盟一体化则以换位赤字为代表。另一方面,当公司或国家政府对委员会的决定提出上诉时,委员会的决定被撤销 欧盟法院的驳回决定与换位赤字正相关。这一证据表明,虽然委员会对一体化阻力较大的国家有偏见,但法院纠正了这种偏见,因为其任务是保证欧盟治理体系中的法治。我们认为,这些显露的政策偏好与这两个机构试图通过根据其职责做出决定来加强其合法性的假设是一致的。此外,这对合法性的双重追求之间的相互作用加强了联盟的整体合法性,表明了制度均衡方法演变的另一个驱动力。这一证据表明,虽然委员会对一体化阻力较大的国家有偏见,但法院纠正了这种偏见,因为其任务是保证欧盟治理体系中的法治。我们认为,这些显露的政策偏好与这两个机构试图通过根据其职责做出决定来加强其合法性的假设是一致的。此外,这对合法性的双重追求之间的相互作用加强了联盟的整体合法性,表明了制度均衡方法演变的另一个驱动力。这一证据表明,虽然委员会对一体化阻力较大的国家有偏见,但法院纠正了这种偏见,因为其任务是保证欧盟治理体系中的法治。我们认为,这些显露的政策偏好与这两个机构试图通过根据其职责做出决定来加强其合法性的假设是一致的。此外,这对合法性的双重追求之间的相互作用加强了联盟的整体合法性,表明了制度均衡方法演变的另一个驱动力。我们认为,这些显露的政策偏好与这两个机构试图通过根据其职责做出决定来加强其合法性的假设是一致的。此外,这对合法性的双重追求之间的相互作用加强了联盟的整体合法性,表明了制度均衡方法演变的另一个驱动力。我们认为,这些显露的政策偏好与这两个机构试图通过根据其职责做出决定来加强其合法性的假设是一致的。此外,这对合法性的双重追求之间的相互作用加强了联盟的整体合法性,表明了制度均衡方法演变的另一个驱动力。

更新日期:2021-03-03
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