We consider dynamic communication mechanisms in a quasi-linear environment with single-dimensional types. The mechanism designer gradually identifies agents’ valuations by iteratively offering prices to agents at different stages. Agents pay the maximum price they accepted if their desirable decision is made. We show that within weakly tight mechanisms, if a communication mechanism is ex-post incentive compatible, then it is a monotone-price mechanism. English auctions are characterized as a class of mechanisms that satisfy ex-post incentive compatibility and efficiency.

中文翻译：

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动态通讯机制设计

我们考虑具有一维类型的准线性环境中的动态通信机制。机制设计者通过迭代地向代理商提供不同阶段的价格来逐步确定代理商的估值。如果代理商做出了他们所希望的决定，他们将支付他们接受的最高价格。我们表明，在弱紧机制中，如果沟通机制是事后激励兼容的，那么它就是单调价格机制。英国拍卖的特点是满足事后激励兼容性和效率的一类机制。