当前位置: X-MOL 学术Eur. J. Oper. Res. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
The impacts of money-back guarantees in the presence of parallel importation
European Journal of Operational Research ( IF 6.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-03 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2021.02.057
Yong Zhang , Sheng Hao Zhang , Haofang Feng

This paper studies the impacts of money-back guarantees (MBGs) in the presence of parallel importation, where a manufacturer sells a product facing customer fit uncertainties in two markets and a parallel importer diverts unauthorized products from the low-price market to the high-price one. The two firms compete in both pricing and MBG strategies. We consider two types of parallel importers, a third-party agent and an authorized retailer in the low-price market, respectively. By applying the certainty equivalent pricing approach, we show that offering MBGs only changes firms’ marginal costs without affecting customers’ purchasing decisions directly. When the net salvage values of returned products are positive in the high-price market, both the manufacturer and the third-party agent offer MBGs. Whenever the manufacturer offers an MBG in the low-price market, there is a price inflation effect that counters parallel importation. Therefore the manufacturer may offer the MBG even if the net salvage value is negative. When the authorized retailer decides refund policies in two markets, the MBG strategy in one market changes the retailer’s profit from the authorized channel and that from the gray market in opposite directions, and has an interaction with the refund policy in another market. No refund may be preferred in either market even if the net salvage value is positive. We find that the manufacturer’s MBG strategy in the high-price market always deters parallel importation while other MBG strategies may achieve Pareto improvements in the equilibrium.



中文翻译:

存在平行进口时退款保证的影响

本文研究了在平行进口情况下退款保证 (MBG) 的影响,即制造商在两个市场销售面临客户适合度不确定性的产品,而平行进口商将未经授权的产品从低价市场转移到高价市场。价格一。两家公司在定价和 MBG 策略上都存在竞争。我们考虑两种平行进口商,分别是低价市场中的第三方代理和授权零售商。通过应用确定性等效定价方法,我们表明提供 MBG 只会改变公司的边际成本,而不会直接影响客户的购买决策。当退回产品的净残值在高价市场为正值时,制造商和第三方代理均提供 MBG。每当制造商在低价市场上提供 MBG 时,就会出现价格膨胀效应,从而对抗平行进口。因此,即使净残值为负,制造商也可以提供 MBG。当授权零售商决定两个市场的退款政策时,一个市场的MBG策略使零售商从授权渠道和灰色市场获得的利润向相反的方向变化,并与另一个市场的退款政策相互作用。即使净残值是正数,在任一市场中也可能不优选退款。我们发现制造商在高价市场上的MBG策略总是会阻止平行进口,而其他MBG策略可能会实现均衡的帕累托改进。因此,即使净残值为负,制造商也可以提供 MBG。当授权零售商决定两个市场的退款政策时,一个市场的MBG策略使零售商从授权渠道和灰色市场获得的利润向相反的方向变化,并与另一个市场的退款政策相互作用。即使净残值是正数,在任一市场中也可能不优选退款。我们发现制造商在高价市场上的MBG策略总是会阻止平行进口,而其他MBG策略可能会实现均衡的帕累托改进。因此,即使净残值为负,制造商也可以提供 MBG。当授权零售商决定两个市场的退款政策时,一个市场的MBG策略使零售商从授权渠道和灰色市场获得的利润向相反的方向变化,并与另一个市场的退款政策相互作用。即使净残值是正数,在任一市场中也可能不优选退款。我们发现制造商在高价市场上的MBG策略总是会阻止平行进口,而其他MBG策略可能会实现均衡的帕累托改进。一个市场的MBG策略使零售商从授权渠道和灰色市场获得的利润向相反的方向变化,并与另一个市场的退款政策相互作用。即使净残值是正数,在任一市场中也可能不优选退款。我们发现制造商在高价市场上的MBG策略总是会阻止平行进口,而其他MBG策略可能会实现均衡的帕累托改进。一个市场的MBG策略使零售商从授权渠道和灰色市场获得的利润向相反的方向变化,并与另一个市场的退款政策相互作用。即使净残值是正数,在任一市场中也可能不优选退款。我们发现制造商在高价市场上的MBG策略总是会阻止平行进口,而其他MBG策略可能会实现均衡的帕累托改进。

更新日期:2021-03-03
down
wechat
bug