Most countries reduce Disability Insurance (DI) benefits for beneficiaries earning above a specified threshold. Such an earnings threshold generates a discontinuous increase in tax liability – a notch – and creates an incentive to keep earnings below the threshold. Exploiting such a notch in Austria, we provide transparent and credible identification of the effect of financial incentives on DI beneficiaries' earnings. Using rich administrative data, we document large and sharp bunching at the earnings threshold. However, the elasticity driving these responses is small. Our estimate suggests that relaxing the earnings threshold reduces fiscal cost only if program entry is very inelastic.

中文翻译：

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残疾保险接受者的财务激励和收入：来自缺口设计的证据

大多数国家都会减少收入高于特定阈值的受益人的残疾保险 (DI) 福利。这样的收入门槛会导致纳税义务的不连续增加——一个档次——并创造一种将收入保持在门槛以下的动力。利用奥地利的这一缺口，我们提供了财务激励对 DI 受益人收入影响的透明和可信的识别。使用丰富的管理数据，我们记录了在收入阈值处的大而尖锐的聚集。然而，驱动这些反应的弹性很小。我们的估计表明，只有在项目进入非常缺乏弹性的情况下，放宽收入门槛才能降低财政成本。