This paper studies the consequences of regulating executive compensation at financial institutions by examining the introduction of the UK Remuneration Code in 2010, which aimed to change the decision-making horizon and risk-taking incentives of bank executives. We find that, although both banks and nonbanks show increased contribution and sensitivity to systemic risk in the United Kingdom post-2010, this increase is lower for UK banks, in line with the intent of the regulation. However, UK banks also experience higher unforced CEO turnover when compared to other UK firms. Therefore, while the regulation may have had the desired effect on systemic risk, it may also have given rise to some unintended consequences.

中文翻译：

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薪酬和系统性风险的监管：来自英国的证据

本文通过考察 2010 年英国薪酬法的出台，研究了监管金融机构高管薪酬的后果，旨在改变银行高管的决策视野和冒险动机。我们发现，尽管银行和非银行机构在 2010 年后对英国系统性风险的贡献和敏感性均有所增加，但英国银行的这一增幅较低，符合监管的意图。然而，与其他英国公司相比，英国银行也经历了更高的非强制 CEO 更替率。因此，虽然监管可能对系统性风险产生了预期的影响，但也可能产生了一些意想不到的后果。