We find that banks with CEOs who postpone exercising deep in-the-money options are more likely to lend to firms that are smaller, riskier, and more engaged in corporate innovation. These borrowers also spend more on R&D than a matched sample after getting the loans. Subsequently, these borrowers have higher innovation outputs and achieve greater market valuations. Overall, our findings suggest that the bank CEOs who reveal a high risk-taking attitude by their option exercising behavior help facilitate technological progress via the syndicate loans.

中文翻译：

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银行首席执行官的冒险精神与企业创新

我们发现，那些拥有首席执行官的银行推迟执行深层的货币期权的银行更有可能借贷给规模较小，风险更高且更参与公司创新的公司。这些借款人在获得贷款后，在研发方面的支出也要比对等的样本多。随后，这些借款人具有更高的创新产出并获得了更高的市场估值。总体而言，我们的发现表明，通过选择行权行为表现出高度冒险精神的银行首席执行官通过银团贷款帮助促进了技术进步。