This study investigates whether brokerage houses appear to provide stock tips to politicians. Our results indicate that trades by politicians who are politically connected to the brokerage house where the trade is executed are more profitable. Our estimates suggest that these connected trades earn an incremental 0.3% over a five-day window relative to the politician's average profitability. Given the average number of trades our sample politicians execute in a year, the 0.3% return per trade translates to an incremental $3,411 in trading profits each year. We provide additional support by investigating the frequency and differential profitability of politicians' trades immediately before the brokerage house issues a revised recommendation, as well as during a period when Goldman, Sachs & Co. was sanctioned for providing stock tips to high priority clients. Additional tests suggest that brokerages may provide stock tips to politicians in exchange for favorable legislative outcomes or political information.

本研究调查经纪公司是否似乎向政客提供股票提示。我们的结果表明，与执行交易的经纪行有政治联系的政客进行的交易更有利可图。我们的估计表明，相对于政治家的平均盈利能力，这些关联交易在 5 天窗口内的收益增加了 0.3%。考虑到我们的样本政客一年执行的平均交易次数，每笔交易 0.3% 的回报意味着每年增加的交易利润为 3,411 美元。我们通过在经纪公司发布修订后的建议之前以及高盛、萨克斯公司 (Goldman, Sachs & Co. 因向高优先级客户提供股票提示而受到制裁。其他测试表明，经纪商可能会向政客提供股票提示，以换取有利的立法结果或政治信息。