This article studies equilibrium dynamics in consumer durable goods markets after aggregate credit shocks. We introduce two novel features into a general-equilibrium model of durable consumption with heterogeneous households facing idiosyncratic income risk and borrowing constraints: (1) indivisible durable goods are vertically differentiated in their quality and (2) trade on secondary markets at market-clearing prices, with households endogenously choosing when to trade or scrap their durables. The model highlights a new transmission mechanism for macroeconomic shocks and successfully matches several empirical patterns that we document using data on U.S. car markets around the Great Recession. After a tightening of the borrowing limit, debt-constrained households postpone the decision to scrap and upgrade their low-quality cars, which depresses mid-quality car prices. In turn, this effect reduces wealthy households’ incentives to replace their mid-quality cars with high-quality ones, thereby decreasing new-car sales. We further use our framework to evaluate targeted fiscal stimulus policies such as the Car Allowance Rebate System in 2009 (“Cash for Clunkers”).

中文翻译：

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耐用消费品市场的信用冲击和均衡动态

本文研究了总体信贷冲击后耐用消费品市场的均衡动态。我们在耐用消费的一般均衡模型中引入了两个新特征，其中异质家庭面临着特殊的收入风险和借贷约束：（1）不可分割的耐用品在质量上具有垂直差异；（2）在二级市场上以市场出清价格进行交易，家庭内生地选择何时交易或报废耐用品。该模型突出了宏观经济冲击的新传导机制，并成功匹配了我们使用大萧条时期美国汽车市场数据记录的几种经验模式。在收紧借贷限额后，受债务约束的家庭推迟了报废和升级劣质汽车的决定，这压低了中等质量的汽车价格。反过来，这种效应降低了富裕家庭用优质汽车替换中等品质汽车的动力，从而降低了新车销量。我们进一步使用我们的框架来评估有针对性的财政刺激政策，例如 2009 年的汽车津贴回扣制度（“旧车换现金”）。