Under dynamic efficiency, a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension scheme helps the current generation of retirees but hurts future generations because they are forced to saveviaa return-dominated scheme. Abandoning it is deemed welfare-improving but typically not for all generations. But what if agents are present-biased (hence, undersave for retirement) and the “paternalistically motivated forced savings” component of a PAYG scheme motivated its existence in the first place? This paper shows it is possible to transition from such a PAYG scheme on to a higher return, mandated fully-funded scheme; yet, no generation is hurt in the process. The results inform the debate on policy design of pension systems as more and more policy makers push for the transition to take place but are forced to recognize that current retirees may get hurt along the way.

中文翻译：

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近视下向全资养老金的帕累托改进过渡

在动态效率下，现收现付 (PAYG) 养老金计划帮助了当前这一代退休人员，但伤害了后代，因为他们被迫储蓄通过以回报为主导的计划。放弃它被认为可以改善福利，但通常不会对所有世代都适用。但是，如果代理人存在偏见（因此，退休储蓄不足）并且 PAYG 计划的“家长式动机强迫储蓄”部分首先促使其存在呢？本文表明，从这种现收现付计划过渡到更高回报、强制性的全额资助计划是可能的；然而，没有一代人在此过程中受到伤害。随着越来越多的政策制定者推动过渡，但不得不承认当前的退休人员可能会在此过程中受到伤害，这些结果为关于养老金制度政策设计的辩论提供了依据。