ABSTRACT

How do we assess the power of governments to control and set the agenda in parliaments? How do we assess the power of oppositions to present their agenda? Cox and McCubbins’ cartel model used a roll rate analysis of legislation, while Krehbiel suggested the use of non-legislative tools. Based on this advice, this article investigates the use of a non-legislative tool – motions for the agenda – in the Israeli Knesset, or more specifically: ‘the agenda power of non-legislative tools’ defined as the ability to block or significantly delay motions from reaching a debate in committee. Using data from the Knesset, in which the opposition operates in a parliamentary system with multiparty coalition governments, it demonstrates that opposition legislators utilise these non-legislative tools more extensively than coalition members to wield their agenda power. The findings support the addition of this tool to the cartel model.

摘要

我们如何评估政府控制和制定议会议程的权力？我们如何评估反对派提出其议程的力量？Cox和McCubbins的卡特尔模型使用了立法的滚动率分析，而Krehbiel建议使用非立法工具。根据这一建议，本文将研究以色列议会中非立法性工具（即议程动议）的使用，或更具体地讲：“非立法性工具的议程权力”的定义是阻止或大幅拖延的能力在委员会辩论中提出的动议。利用以色列议会的数据，在该数据中，反对派与多党联合政府在议会制中运作，它表明，反对派立法者比联盟成员更广泛地利用这些非立法工具来行使其议事权。研究结果支持将这种工具添加到卡特尔模型中。