ABSTRACT

Exploiting the interstate branching restrictiveness law that allowed states to erect barriers to branch expansion, we test whether increased interbank competition increases risk-bearing, proxied by higher loan default, for third-party loan guarantors. We find that Small Business Administration (SBA) loans from states with higher restrictiveness (lower competition) are less likely to default, by at least four percent. The findings are robust to a variety of falsification tests. Confirming increased risk transfer to SBA, banks in less restrictive states facing increased competition: increased both SBA loan amount and duration of the loan and the learning-by-loaning (cumulative loan volume before the current loan) did not affect the likelihood of default of the current loan. Counterfactually, loans of higher approval amount and longer duration were less likely to default in more restrictive states.

摘要

利用允许各州建立分支机构扩张障碍的州际分支限制法则，我们测试了银行间竞争加剧是否会为第三方贷款担保人增加较高的贷款违约率所带来的风险。我们发现，来自限制性较高（竞争较低）的州的小企业管理局（SBA）贷款的违约可能性较小，至少为百分之四。该发现对于各种伪造测试都是可靠的。确认向SBA转移的风险有所增加，限制较少的州的银行面临竞争加剧：SBA贷款额和贷款期限的增加，以及借贷学习（当前贷款之前的累计贷款量）均未影响违约的可能性。当前的贷款。相反，