This paper studies retirement and child support policies in a small, open, overlapping-generations economy with PAYG social security and endogenous retirement and fertility decisions. It demonstrates that neither fertility nor retirement choices necessarily coincide with socially optimal allocation, because agents do not take into account the externalities of fertility and the elderly labor supply in the economy as a whole. It shows that governments can realize the first-best allocation by introducing a child allowance scheme and a subsidy to incentivize the labor supply of older workers. As an alternative to subsidizing the elderly labor supply, we show that the first-best allocation can also be achieved by controlling the retirement age. Finally, the model is simulated in order to study whether the policies devoted to realizing the social optimum in a market economy could be a Pareto improvement.

本文研究了一个小型，开放，两代人的经济中的退休和子女抚养政策，该政策具有现收现付制社会保障以及内生的退休和生育决定。它表明，生育率和退休选择都不一定与社会最优分配相吻合，因为代理商没有考虑到生育率和整个经济中老年人劳动供给的外部性。它表明，政府可以通过引入子女津贴计划和补贴来激励年长工人的劳动力供应，从而实现最佳分配。作为补贴老年人劳动力供应的一种替代方法，我们表明，通过控制退休年龄也可以实现最佳分配。最后，