There are two different albeit overlapping senses in which one might do a ‘philosophical sociology’, and Daniel Chernilo’s (2017a) Debating Humanity bears the mark of both of them. On the one hand, the ‘philosophical sociologist’ might treat sociological practice as itself an expression of certain philosophical themes and orientations relating to the human condition. This was quite popular when I first studied sociology as an undergraduate in the 1970s. Back then it was often called ‘reflexive sociology’, and it framed sociological texts as literary works, focused on guiding metaphors, ironic turns and other rhetorical devices that served at once to foreground and occlude certain topics from consideration. The focus was on the sociologist as participant-observer of the changes happening in his or her society. I read such works as providing tools – perhaps even paradigms – for constructing a world-view (Weltanschauung) from a combination of one’s understanding of the past and one’s experiences of the present, which together might be projected into the future. In this respect, and very much as Karl Mannheim thought, all sociology is ‘always already’ the sociology of knowledge. ‘Philosophical sociology’ in this sense was popular across the ideological spectrum, from the neo-conservative Robert Nisbet (1976) to the critical theorist Richard Harvey Brown (1977). The bulk of Chernilo’s book is a bit like this too, though his style is rather more scholastic and less literary than theirs. On the other hand, ‘philosophical sociology’ might be another way to talk about ‘philosophical anthropology’, which tries to understand the totality of human phenomena as the expression of some philosophical point about the nature of humanity: What does it mean to be ‘human’? The first person to lay claim to the title of ‘philosophical anthropologist’ was one of the founders of the sociology of knowledge, Max Scheler, to whom Chernilo tips his hat in both the introduction and the conclusion. But these are really the only places where he pursues this more ambitious sense of ‘philosophical sociology’, a fact that may disappoint readers, given that Chernilo clearly realizes the significance of ‘debating humanity’ at a time when we are opening ourselves to ‘trans-‘ and ‘post-‘ human futures. In that case, his book is perhaps charitably read as a ‘propaedeutic’ (i.e. a throat-clearing exercise) to that larger project and is best judged by the insights he derives from the theorists he considers in terms of the prospects for what I have called ‘Humanity 2.0’ (Fuller 2011). I doubt that many of the late twentieth century theorists to whom Chernilo devotes chapters in this book will be even referenced in a social theory book called ‘Debating Humanity’, say, a halfor maybe even a quarter-century

中文翻译：

---

我们与人类的仇恨关系

尽管存在两种重叠的感觉，但其中一种可能是一种``哲学社会学''，但丹尼尔·切尔尼洛（Daniel Chernilo）（2017a）的《辩论人类》具有两者的印记。一方面，“哲学社会学家”可能会将社会学实践本身视为某些与人类状况相关的哲学主题和取向的表达。当我在1970年代作为一名本科生首次学习社会学时，这非常受欢迎。当时它通常被称为“反身社会学”，它把社会学文本构筑成文学作品，重点放在指导隐喻，讽刺性转折和其他修辞手段上，这些手段立刻发挥作用，将某些主题排除在外。重点是作为社会观察者的社会学家，他或她的社会正在发生变化。我读过这样的著作，即提供一种工具-也许甚至是范式-从一个人对过去的理解和一个​​人对现在的经验的结合，来构建一种世界观（Weltanschauung），这些东西可能一起被投射到未来。在这方面，就像卡尔·曼海姆（Karl Mannheim）所认为的那样，所有社会学都已经“永远”是知识社会学。从新保守主义的罗伯特·尼斯贝特（1976）到批判理论家理查德·哈维·布朗（Richard Harvey Brown）（1977），这种意义上的“哲学社会学”在整个意识形态领域都很流行。切尔尼洛的书中的大部分内容也都与此类似，尽管他的风格比他们的风格更具学术性和文学性。另一方面，“哲学社会学”可能是谈论“哲学人类学”的另一种方式，它试图将人类现象的整体理解为关于人类本质的一些哲学观点的表达：“人类”是什么意思？知识社会学的创始人马克斯·舍勒（Max Scheler）是第一个获得“哲学人类学家”称号的人，切尔尼洛在引言和结论中都向他致敬。但这实际上是他追求雄心勃勃的“哲学社会学”意义的唯一地方，鉴于切尔尼洛在我们向“跨性别者开放”之时清楚地意识到了“辩论人性”的重要性，这可能会让读者感到失望。 -和“后”人类的未来。在这种情况下，他的书也许可以被慈善地读作“ propaedeutic”（即 一项更大的项目），最好根据他从我认为是“人类2.0”前景的理论家那里得出的见识来判断（Fuller 2011）。我怀疑，切尔尼洛在本书中专门讨论章节的20世纪晚期理论家中的许多人，甚至在一部名为“辩论人类”的社会理论书中都将被引用，比如说，半个世纪甚至四分之一世纪