ABSTRACT

This article studies how the governance of a colonial value-chain impacted upon the value-added created. The article focuses on the value-chain of colonial sugar produced in the slave plantation complex in the Americas. Previous research has suggested that British planters in the Caribbean were able to reap high profits because of a protected market for sugar in Britain. In this paper, it is argued that it was mainly British refiners that were able to profit from these protectionist policies. Wholesale prices of muscovado sugar are shown to have been more or less on a par with those prevalent under free-market conditions, whereas the price of refined sugar was considerably higher in Britain than it presumably would have been in a free-market. Limited competition and active collusion between refiners seem to have increased the mark-up on the refined sugar relative to the price of muscovado in Britain. Focusing only on the profitability on certain links in value-chains associated with the slave plantation complex in the Americas (most importantly the slave trade) might detract attention from how the governance structure of the value-chains allowed profits to be reaped elsewhere in the same value-chains.

摘要

本文研究了殖民价值链的治理如何影响所创造的增值。本文重点介绍了美洲奴隶种植园中产生的殖民地糖的价值链。先前的研究表明，由于英国糖市场的保护，加勒比海的英国​​种植者能够获得高额利润。本文认为，主要是英国炼油厂能够从这些贸易保护主义政策中获利。粘多糖的批发价格已显示出与自由市场条件下普遍的价格相当，而英国的精制糖价格比自由市场上的价格高得多。精炼厂之间有限的竞争和积极的勾结似乎相对于英国muscovado的价格提高了精制糖的价格。仅关注与美洲的奴隶种植园相关的价值链中某些环节的获利能力（最重要的是奴隶贸易）可能使人们对价值链的治理结构如何使利润从同一地区的其他地方获得收益转移注意力价值链。