This study investigates airport pricing and capacity investment when passengers face schedule and congestion delays. Two countries' airports are served by each country's home carrier. Airports choose their charges on a per-flight and/or per-passenger basis. Given the general observation that carriers that compete on parallel international routes often form codeshare alliances to increase the schedule they are able to provide, we find the following. First, the first-best movement-related per-flight charges do not necessarily need to charge congestion delay costs if there is a positive externality that happens to compensate for the negative congestion externality. Second, when positive and negative externalities cancel out, choosing per-passenger charges alone (known as the second-best approach, in which per-flight charges are weight-related and become equivalent to per-passenger charges) can also lead to the first-best outcome. However, choosing movement-related per-flight charges alone (another second-best approach) cannot do so. Third, under the former second-best pricing approach, capacity investment could be globally efficient. However, under the latter second-best pricing approach, each airport overinvests.

本研究调查了当乘客面临航班时刻表和拥堵延误时的机场定价和容量投资。两个国家的机场由每个国家的本土航空公司提供服务。机场根据每趟航班和/或每名乘客选择收费。鉴于在平行国际航线上竞争的承运人通常形成代码共享联盟以增加他们能够提供的时间表的普遍观察，我们发现以下内容。首先，如果存在正外部性恰好补偿了负拥塞外部性，则与第一最佳运动相关的每次飞行费用不一定需要收取拥堵延迟成本。其次，当正负外部性抵消时，单独选择按乘客收费（称为次优方法，其中每次飞行的费用与重量相关并等同于每名乘客的费用）也可以导致最佳结果。但是，仅选择与运动相关的每次飞行费用（另一种次优方法）不能这样做。第三，在以前的次优定价方法下，产能投资可能是全球有效的。然而，在后一种次优定价方法下，每个机场都过度投资。