Abstract Most research on agency problems focuses on the entrenchment of minority shareholders in the forms of excess executive compensation, unfair transactions among related parties, etc. ( La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000 ; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997 ). This paper investigates how insiders’ compensation is impacted based on the types of agency problems. In particular, we examine if the positive association between agency problems and excess compensation reverses due to reputation effects. Specifically, controlling shareholders are inclined to curb on insider compensation to avoid disciplinary action by outsiders when investors are more likely to be aware of exploitation problems arising from severe agency problems. This study finds that the presence of pyramidal ownership structures, which are traditionally deemed as entrenchment mechanisms over minority shareholders, decreases pay-performance sensitivity only in non-family firms. In contrast, pyramidal ownership and higher control-ownership deviation reduce insider compensation in family firms. Namely, compensation serves as a commitment mechanism with the combination of family ownership and control-enhancing mechanisms. Moreover, prior studies argue that management compensation is lower in family firms compared with non-family firms, we find the results do not hold after controlling for the control-enhancing mechanisms.

中文翻译：

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代理问题的阴暗面：来自家族金字塔公司内部人补偿的证据

摘要大多数关于代理问题的研究都集中在以超额高管薪酬，关联方之间的不公平交易等形式来巩固少数股东的利益（La Porta，Lopez-de-Silanes，Shleifer和Vishny，2000； Shl​​eifer和Vishny，2000， 1997）。本文根据代理问题的类型，研究内部人的报酬如何受到影响。特别是，我们研究了代理问题和超额报酬之间的正相关是否由于声誉效应而逆转。具体而言，当投资者更可能意识到严重的代理问题所引起的剥削问题时，控股股东倾向于遏制内部人的报酬，以避免外部人的纪律处分。这项研究发现，金字塔所有制结构的存在，传统上被认为是对小股东的固定机制，仅在非家族企业中降低了对薪资绩效的敏感性。相反，金字塔形所有权和较高的控制所有权偏差会减少家族企业的内部人报酬。即，补偿是结合家庭所有制和控制增强机制的一种承诺机制。此外，先前的研究认为，家族企业的管理报酬比非家族企业要低，我们发现在控制了控制增强机制之后，结果并没有成立。补偿是结合家庭所有制和控制增强机制的一种承诺机制。此外，先前的研究认为，家族企业的管理报酬比非家族企业要低，我们发现在控制了控制增强机制之后，结果并没有成立。补偿是结合家庭所有制和控制增强机制的一种承诺机制。此外，先前的研究认为，家族企业的管理报酬比非家族企业要低，我们发现在控制了控制增强机制之后，结果并没有成立。