Abstract This study investigates the optimal level of transfer prices chosen by managers in a divisionalized firm when they are evaluated based on a balanced scorecard. A unique assumption of our model is that transfer prices are unobservable to a competing firm's managers. In contrast to the findings in several studies that examine strategic transfer pricing, this research shows that a manager who is evaluated using a balanced scorecard chooses a transfer price that exceeds marginal cost given a market competitor in a specific economic environment. This result is caused mainly by our model's assumption that a manager considers the competitor's profit in his/her in decision-making when the objective is to maximize long-term profit. This study makes a significant contribution to the strategic transfer pricing literature by showing that even if the transfer price is unobservable to rivals, the optimal transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the final product market is characterized by price competition, something not shown in previous analytical accounting research.

中文翻译：

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使用平衡记分卡评估经理时，无法观察到的转让价格超过边际成本

摘要这项研究调查了在基于平衡计分卡进行评估时，一家分公司的经理选择的转移价格的最优水平。我们模型的一个独特假设是，转让价格对竞争公司的管理者而言是不可观察的。与多项研究战略转移定价的研究结果相反，该研究表明，在特定经济环境下，给定市场竞争者的情况下，使用平衡计分卡进行评估的经理选择的转移价格超过边际成本。该结果主要是由于我们的模型假设所致，即当目标是最大化长期利润时，管理者会在制定决策时考虑竞争对手的利润。