Abstract Based on agency theory, if equity compensation aligns audit committee members' interests with those of shareholders, the audit committee will provide effective oversight and demand more thorough audit coverage and scope. This will result in higher audit fees paid to the external auditor. This study specifically examines the associations between the types of equity compensation of audit committee members and audit fees. Our findings show differential impacts of equity compensation of audit committee in the forms of option grants and stock awards on audit fees. Specifically, equity compensation using stock awards is more effective than using option grants in aligning the interests of audit committee members with the interests of shareholders to provide better oversight of financial reporting.

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审计委员会的股权补偿方式如何影响审计费用？

摘要基于代理理论，如果股权补偿能够使审计委员会成员的利益与股东利益保持一致，则审计委员会将提供有效的监督，并要求更全面的审计范围和范围。这将导致支付给外部审计师的审计费用更高。本研究专门研究了审计委员会成员的股权补偿类型与审计费用之间的关联。我们的发现显示，以期权授予和股票奖励形式对审计委员会的股权补偿产生了不同的影响。具体而言，使用股票奖励进行股权补偿比使用期权授予更有效，可以使审计委员会成员的利益与股东利益保持一致，从而更好地监督财务报告。