Abstract We investigate whether CFO debt-like compensation incentives and their alignment with CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with financial reporting quality. He (2015) finds that CEO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with higher financial reporting quality. Consistent with agency theory, we extend He (2015) by considering CFO debt-like compensation incentives. Overall, we find that CFO debt-like compensation incentives are associated with better financial reporting quality while controlling for CEO debt-like compensation incentives. These effects are present when the CEO and CFO compensation incentives are aligned with the same party. Further, the CFO effect dominates that of the CEO when examining discretionary accruals, and complements the CEO effect for accrual quality. However, we are unable to find any evidence of an incremental joint effect from the alignment of the CEO and CFO debt-like compensation incentives.

中文翻译：

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CFO类似于债务的薪酬激励措施是否与财务报告质量相关？

摘要我们研究了首席财务官类似债务的薪酬激励措施及其与首席执行官类似债务的薪酬激励措施是否与财务报告质量相关联。他（2015年）发现，首席执行官类似债务的薪酬激励措施与更高的财务报告质量相关。与代理理论相一致，我们通过考虑首席财务官类似债务的薪酬激励机制来扩展He（2015）。总体而言，我们发现CFO类似于债务的薪酬激励措施与更好的财务报告质量相关，同时可以控制CEO类似于债务的薪酬激励措施。当首席执行官和首席财务官的薪酬激励措施与同一方保持一致时，就会出现这些影响。此外，CFO效应在检查可任意计提的权责发生制时主导着CEO的作用，并补充了权责发生制质量上的CEO效应。然而，