In “Perceptual Confidence,” I argue that our perceptual experiences assign degrees of confidence. In “Precision, not Confidence, Describes the Uncertainty of Perceptual Experience,” Rachel Denison disagrees. I believe that most of our disagreements are merely terminological, because they just reflect differences in how we use the terms ‘perceptual experiences’, ‘assign’ and ‘confidence’. If I’m right, only two of our disagreements are substantive, in particular whether perception involves automatic categorization, and whether there is an intrinsic difference between a blurry perception of a sharp image and a sharp perception of a blurry image. In the next section I will introduce a framework for discussing all our disagreements.

中文翻译：

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知觉置信度和分类

在“感知信心”中，我认为我们的感知经验决定了信心的程度。在“精确，而不是信心，描述了感知体验的不确定性”中，雷切尔丹尼森不同意。我相信我们的大多数分歧仅仅是术语上的，因为它们只是反映了我们如何使用“感知体验”、“分配”和“信心”等术语的不同。如果我是对的，我们的分歧中只有两个是实质性的，特别是感知是否涉及自动分类，以及清晰图像的模糊感知和模糊图像的清晰感知之间是否存在内在差异。在下一节中，我将介绍一个讨论我们所有分歧的框架。