Most contemporary theorists regard the traditional thesis that perception is essentially conscious as just another armchair edict to be abandoned in the wake of empirical discovery. Here I reconsider this dramatic departure from tradition. My aim is not to recapture our prelapsarian confidence that perception is inevitably conscious (though much I say might be recruited to that cause). Instead, I want to problematize the now ubiquitous belief in unconscious perception. The paper divides into two parts. Part One is more purely philosophical. It explains how standard arguments for unconscious perception rely on contentious background assumptions concerning the relation between ordinary perception and the explanatory constructs of scientific psychology. Part Two, in contrast, offers detailed engagement with relevant empirical work. It exposes how, even setting aside the concerns identified in Part One, a dilemma confronts the believer in unconscious perception. This dilemma arises because ordinary perception is an individual-level state or occurrence, yet criteria sufficiently stringent to guarantee that a putatively perceptual state is unconscious vitiate the grounds for its attribution to the individual. The dilemma foments a hypothesis, namely that the conditions for genuine, individual-level perception are sufficient conditions for perceptual consciousness. The viability of this hypothesis should unnerve anyone who thinks unconscious perception is simply an empirical given.

中文翻译：

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重新考虑无意识知觉

大多数当代理论家认为感知本质上是有意识的传统论点只是在经验发现之后被放弃的另一条扶手椅法令。在这里，我重新考虑了这种与传统的戏剧性背离。我的目标不是要重新获得我们的堕落前的信心，即感知不可避免地是有意识的（尽管我说的很多内容可能会被招募到这个原因）。相反，我想对现在无处不在的无意识感知信念提出问题。论文分为两部分。第一部分更纯粹是哲学性的。它解释了无意识知觉的标准论点如何依赖于关于普通知觉与科学心理学解释性结构之间关系的有争议的背景假设。相反，第二部分详细介绍了相关的实证工作。它揭示了如何，即使撇开第一部分中确定的关注点，无意识感知中的信徒也面临着两难境地。之所以会出现这种困境，是因为普通知觉是个人层面的状态或事件，但足够严格的标准足以保证假定的知觉状态是无意识的，因此无法将其归因于个人。这种困境引发了一个假设，即真实的、个体层面的感知条件是知觉意识的充分条件。这个假设的可行性应该让那些认为无意识感知只是经验给定的人感到不安。然而，足够严格以保证假定的知觉状态是无意识的标准破坏了将其归因于个人的理由。这种困境引发了一个假设，即真实的、个体层面的感知条件是知觉意识的充分条件。这个假设的可行性应该让那些认为无意识感知只是经验给定的人感到不安。然而，足够严格以保证假定的知觉状态是无意识的标准破坏了将其归因于个人的理由。这种困境引发了一个假设，即真实的、个体层面的感知条件是知觉意识的充分条件。这个假设的可行性应该让那些认为无意识感知只是经验给定的人感到不安。