We argue that intentions are beliefs—beliefs that are held in light of, and made rational by, practical reasoning. To intend to do something is neither more nor less than to believe, on the basis of one’s practical reasoning, that one will do it. The identification of the mental state of intention with the mental state of belief is what we call strong cognitivism about intentions. It is a strong form of cognitivism because we identify intentions with beliefs, rather than maintaining that beliefs are entailed by intentions or are components of them. To illustrate the basic idea, consider the attitude that you might express with the words, “I am going to fail this exam” (Anscombe 1957/2000, 2). We propose that this attitude is a practical conclusion if it is grounded in practical reasoning—if you hold it because you see failing the exam as somehow worthwhile. (Perhaps it will impress your love interest.) It is a theoretical conclusion if it is held in light of evidence. (Perhaps you think that you have not studied enough to do well.) We hold that both conclusions constitute beliefs and exhibit the functional roles of belief. The former is an intention or, as we shall sometimes say, a “practical” belief, the latter an evidence-based, “theoretical” belief. The aim of strong cognitivism is to explain the relation between practical and theoretical reasoning—that is, to explain how reasoning about what to do relates to reasoning about what will happen in the future. This relation is difficult to understand if practical and theoretical reasoning are seen as answering different sorts of questions—if, say, the conclusion of practical reasoning is supposed to be a judgment about what it would be good to do, or what one ought to do, or what one has most reason to do. By contrast, we hold that these two forms of reasoning are related because practical reasoning is concerned with a factual question—the question of what one is going to do. This is why we say that practical reasoning and theoretical reasoning both issue in beliefs. What distinguishes the conclusions of practical and theoretical reasoning is not what they are about but how they are grounded—that is, the form of reasoning in light of which the respective conclusions are held. In what follows, we first describe what we take to be the essential features of practical reasoning and explain how practical reasoning can ground belief (§1). We then offer a series of arguments for strong cognitivism (§2) and address a number of objections to it (§3). We conclude with some general remarks about why strong cognitivism of the kind we defend is philosophically important.

中文翻译：

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意图即相信：为强认知主义辩护

我们认为，意图是信念——根据实践推理而持有的信念，并通过实践推理使其变得合理。打算做某事，无异于相信，基于一个人的实践推理，他会去做。意图心理状态与信念心理状态的认同，就是我们所说的关于意图的强认知主义。它是一种强大的认知主义形式，因为我们将意图与信念结合起来，而不是坚持信念是由意图所包含的或它们的组成部分。为了说明基本思想，请考虑您可能用“我将无法通过这次考试”（Anscombe 1957/2000, 2）这句话表达的态度。我们认为，如果这种态度是基于实际推理的，那么这种态度是一个实际的结论——如果你持有它是因为你认为考试不及格在某种程度上是值得的。（也许它会打动你的爱人。）如果有证据，这是一个理论上的结论。（也许你认为你学得还不够好。）我们认为，这两个结论都构成信念，并表现出信念的功能作用。前者是一种意图，或者我们有时会说，一种“实际”信念，后者是一种基于证据的“理论”信念。强认知主义的目的是解释实践推理和理论推理之间的关系——也就是说，解释关于做什么的推理与关于未来将发生什么的推理之间的关系。如果实践推理和理论推理被视为回答不同类型的问题，那么这种关系就很难理解——比如说，如果实践推理的结论应该是对做什么是好的，或者应该做什么的判断，或者最有理由去做的事情。相比之下，我们认为这两种推理形式是相关的，因为实践推理涉及一个事实问题——一个人将要做什么的问题。这就是为什么我们说实践推理和理论推理都存在于信念中。区分实践推理和理论推理的结论的不是它们是关于什么的，而是它们的根据方式——即，各自的结论所依据的推理形式。在接下来的内容中，我们首先描述我们认为实践推理的基本特征，并解释实践推理如何建立信念（§1）。然后，我们提供了一系列支持强认知主义的论点（§2），并提出了一些反对意见（§3）。我们以一些关于为什么我们所捍卫的那种强烈的认知主义在哲学上很重要的一般性评论结束。