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Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception
Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2018-09-01 , DOI: 10.1111/phib.12131
Dan Cavedon-Taylor 1
Affiliation  

Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naive realist or purely relational accounts of perception leave cognitive penetration less well-explained, even when formulated with so-called ‘standpoints’ or ‘third relata.’

中文翻译:

朴素的现实主义和感知的认知渗透性

感性体验具有代表性的内容。我对这一主张的论证是对最佳解释的推论。解释是认知渗透。在认知渗透中,知觉体验要么受到因果影响,要么部分由具有代表性的心理状态构成,包括:心理意象、信念、概念和记忆。如果知觉体验具有表征内容,那么就存在认知渗透的背景条件,使现象表面上是可理解的。对感知的天真现实主义或纯粹的关系描述使认知渗透不太好解释,即使用所谓的“立场”或“第三关系”来表述也是如此。
更新日期:2018-09-01
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